• by octonaut on 2/4/2025, 9:31:40 AM

    TIL that OWASP has a bunch of Top 10 projects other than application security. Some others I found:

    - Top 10 for LLMs - https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-for-large-language-mode...

    - Top 10 for OT - https://ot.owasp.org/

    - Top 10 for Smart Contracts - https://owasp.org/www-project-smart-contract-top-10/

    - Top 10 for Open Source Software - https://owasp.org/www-project-open-source-software-top-10/

  • by chillax on 2/4/2025, 8:07:23 AM

    A better link would be the dedicated site for it, also contains introduction which describes what NHI are: https://owasp.org/www-project-non-human-identities-top-10/20...

  • by LoganDark on 2/4/2025, 7:04:21 AM

    Hah, turns out they're talking about stuff like access tokens, not otherkin!

  • by 2d8a875f-39a2-4 on 2/4/2025, 11:24:22 AM

    I especially enjoyed NHI10:2025 Human Use of NHI.

    Time to stop all that pesky human use. Switch off the servers too, just to be sure.

  • by mirages on 2/4/2025, 9:01:17 AM

    This focuses mostly more on internal security (i.e after the attacker already has a foothold inside) versus the classic OWASP that are for external front fracing applications

  • by xg15 on 2/4/2025, 6:40:37 AM

    They are using some fancy wording, but this just seems to be about regular service accounts (i.e. "bots") when they are mixed with user accounts in a SoA setting. No AI needed.

  • by antithesis-nl on 2/4/2025, 12:28:10 PM

    I would love to hear about any useful work around leak/abuse-resistance improvements of service accounts and API keys (i.e. the 'NHI' referenced here -- awkward terminology!). Passkeys are a great solution when some kind of end-user interactivity is feasible, and AWS Secrets Manager is supposedly very good if you're entirely on that platform, but for self-hosting, the options seem limited (and things like Hashicorp Vault still don't fully solve the problem)?

    I recently refactored a moderately complicated system to remove the need for periodic distribution of updated network access credentials, and the best I could come up with were X509 client certificates, which (even if in this case it was a big improvement over the existing state of affairs) feel archaic...

  • by authnopuz on 2/4/2025, 12:03:57 PM

    Another good source of NHI definitions, concepts, and threats https://nhimg.org/the-ultimate-guide-to-non-human-identities

  • by belter on 2/4/2025, 1:06:50 PM

    It’s already wise to establish a shared authentication word or phrase with family and colleagues, because AI can now convincingly mimic a person’s face, voice, gestures, even their gait during video calls or phone conversations. A bot won’t know the secret passcode when you ask for it.

    Within the next 20–25 years, you may need that same safeguard in face-to-face meetings, since Replicants will be lifelike enough to fool anyone.

    Voight-Kampff Test: https://youtu.be/IbBfONITYNg

  • by batmansmk on 2/4/2025, 10:46:14 AM

    Identities are very hard to manage and secure overall. Audits are super long, tedious.

    Adding more dimensions into reviews that aren't properly done right now will be extremely tricky.

  • by zingababba on 2/4/2025, 3:10:54 PM

    Wtf? We have been calling these workload identities for years.

  • by CodeCompost on 2/4/2025, 9:07:25 AM

    Sorry but can anybody explain what Non-Human Identities are?

  • by aetherspawn on 2/4/2025, 6:48:03 AM

    Based on the title and the first few paragraphs, I expected this to be about risk of datacenter security breaches by Bears, and the like.

  • by magicalhippo on 2/4/2025, 6:59:45 AM

    Full title is "OWASP Non-Human Identities Top 10".

    This comprehensive list highlights the most critical challenges in integrating Non-Human Identities (NHIs) into the development lifecycle, ranked based on exploitability, prevalence, detectability, and impact.